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INTRODUCTION 
The Internet is often thought of as the “Wild West” of the 21st 
century—a new territory only sporadically governed by law.1  One 
of the areas in which there is a “law” of the Internet, however, is 
the registration of domain names.2  Each domain name registration 
agreement includes a clause requiring the registrant to adjudicate 
specified disputes concerning their domain name under the 
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”).3  
Most users of the Internet are not aware that the UDRP exists, or 
that it is arguably the reason they can trust that, for example, 
http://www.cnn.com is actually the website of CNN. 
The UDRP is an alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) system 
that was created in 1999 to combat the growing problem of 
 1 Matt Haber, Tarnation! Experts Agree Internet Like ‘Wild West’ Since at Least 
1994, N.Y. OBSERVER, Nov. 14, 2008, http://www.observer.com/2008/media/tarnation-
experts-agree-internet-wild-west-least-1994 (collecting quotations calling the Internet the 
“Wild West”). 
 2 See Bill Stewart, Internet Domain Names, http://www.livinginternet. 
com/i/iw_dns_name.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2009) (“Internet domain names are the 
alphanumeric identifiers we use to refer to hosts on the Internet, like 
‘LivingInternet.com.’”). 
 3 See, e.g., GoDaddy.com—Legal Agreement, https://www.godaddy.com/gdshop/ 
legal_agreements/show_doc.asp?pageid=REG_SA (last visited Nov. 15, 2009) (“You 
agree to be bound by our current Dispute Resolution Policy [the UDRP].  This policy is 
incorporated herein and made a part of this Agreement.”). 
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“cybersquatting”—the practice of registering a domain name that 
corresponds to a trademark before the trademark owner, thereby 
effectively blocking the owner’s access to the Internet under its 
“brand name.”4  If left unchecked, cybersquatting could have 
hampered the commercial growth of the Internet5 by allowing 
wrongdoers to mislead consumers “about the source of the product 
or service offered on the Internet . . . .”6  Over the past ten years, 
the UDRP has been largely successful in combating the problem of 
cybersquatting,7 but it has also been the subject of intense negative 
criticism.8  Some of these criticisms are unwarranted or even 
inaccurate, but there is growing evidence that there are problems 
(both perceived and actual) with the UDRP as currently 
constructed, and that these problems need to be addressed to 
ensure the UDRP’s continued success and viability. 
The “solutions” that have been proposed by critics to address 
the UDRP’s alleged inadequacies generally involve adding 
provisions that would make it function more like traditional 
 4 Jonathan H. Anschell & John J. Lucas, What’s in a Name: Dealing with 
Cybersquatting, 21 ENT. & SPORTS L. 3, 3 (“‘[C]ybersquatters’ [are] online rogues who 
register . . . famous trademarks as domain names and then exploit those domain names 
for profit. . . .  Cybersquatting dates back to the 1990s . . . .”). 
 5 See Torsten Bettinger, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
Dispute Settlement, World Intellectual Property Organization: 4.2 Domain Name Dispute 
Resolution § 1.1 (2003), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232 
add35_en.pdf (explaining that the Internet is consumer directed). 
 6 Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,746 (June 
10, 1998) [hereinafter White Paper], available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ 
ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htm.  The Deputy Director of the WIPO recently 
stated that cybersquatting is not just an issue of protecting rights of trademark holders 
under existing law, but also of “the reliability of the addressing system of the Internet  
. . . .” Press Release, WIPO, Record Number of Cybersquatting Cases in 2008, WIPO 
Proposes Paperless UDRP (Mar. 16, 2009), available at http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/ 
en/articles/2009/article_0005.html. 
 7 See NED BRANTHOVER, INTA INTERNET COMM., UDRP—A SUCCESS STORY: A 
REBUTTAL TO THE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF PROFESSOR MILTON MUELLER IN 
“ROUGH JUSTICE” 10 (2002), available at http://www.inta.org/downloads/ 
tap_udrp_1paper2002.pdf (“[T]he UDRP has been a principal means for ensuring a 
reliable domain name system—one that all Internet users can rely upon to ensure that 
they have reached their intended destination in cyberspace.”). 
 8 See infra Part II; see, e.g., Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Fast, Cheap, and Out of Control: 
Lessons from the ICANN Dispute Resolution Process, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 
191, 196 (2002) (“[A]lthough the UDRP makes a few good procedural choices, it is a 
flawed system that does not operate fairly even within its own limited sphere.”). 
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litigation.9  This Note argues that no single “fix” can correct all of 
the UDRP’s inadequacies, and that a shift towards traditional 
litigation would undermine some of the most important reasons 
that a system of ADR was chosen as the remedy for cybersquatting 
claims (e.g., speed and low cost).  This Note further argues that 
applying traditional ADR principles and the reasoning behind them 
is a better way to address and remedy the UDRP’s problems.  
Accordingly, this Note examines the UDRP in the context of ADR 
in general and arbitration in particular and concludes that the 
UDRP is a fundamentally sound system that has generally 
accomplished its stated objective.  This Note further concludes that 
the UDRP could be substantially improved by adopting certain 
specific additional concepts from ADR and arbitration. 
Part I provides background on domain names, the Internet, 
ADR in general, and the UDRP in particular.  Part II reviews the 
common criticisms of the UDRP and identifies which have merit.  
Part III proposes modifications to the UDRP to address the 
criticisms that are well founded and to improve the UDRP in 
general. 
I. BACKGROUND ON THE INTERNET, ADR, AND THE UDRP 
A. The Internet 
1. The Creation of the Internet and the Internet Corporation 
for Assigned Names and Numbers 
The Internet was created by the U.S. Department of Defense as 
a private utility that was not available for public or commercial 
use.10  In the 1990s, the commercial possibilities of the Internet 
 9 See, e.g., M. Scott Donahey, Adding Appeals Procedure to Dispute Resolution 
Might Satisfy ICANN Critics, 6 ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP. (BNA) 33 (2001) [hereinafter 
Donahey, Adding Appeals Procedure] (arguing for the addition of an appellate system to 
the UDRP). 
 10 Bill Stewart, ARPANET, Internet, http://www.livinginternet.com/i/ii_arpanet.htm 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2009).  “The Internet” is the name for a series of networks that date 
back to 1969, when the United States Department of Defense created ARPANET. Id. 
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were recognized, and it was made available to the public.11  
Opening the network to all resulted in unforeseen problems— 
particularly for trademark owners.12 
To understand these problems, one must first have a basic 
understanding of how the Internet works.  Computers on the 
Internet identify each other by a unique string of numbers assigned 
to each computer called an “IP Address.”13  To make these long 
addresses easier for people to remember, each one is associated 
with a unique alphanumeric “domain name.”14  Thus, instead of 
typing a string of numbers into the address bar of an Internet 
browser, users may simply type in www.domainname.com to reach 
a given site.15  Website owners must “register” (or contract for the 
right to use) domain names with an approved third-party registrar16 
in order for that domain name to “point” users to the IP Address of 
a website.17  The Domain Name System (“DNS”), the key that 
translates each domain name into the corresponding IP Address,18 
initially was controlled by the United States government, but this 
changed when the Internet was opened to commerce and an 
 11 White Paper, supra note 6, at 31,742. 
 12 See id. (discussing the problems facing trademark owners). 
 13 Holger P. Hestermeyer, The Invalidity of ICANN’s UDRP Under National Law, 3 
MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 3 (2002), available at http://mipr.umn.edu/ 
archive/v3n1/hestermeyer.pdf; Bill Stewart, IP Address, http://www.livinginternet.com/i/ 
iw_ip.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2009).  IP Addresses essentially function like a telephone 
number. 
 14 Hestermeyer, supra note 13, at 3; Michael B. Landau, Problems Arising out of the 
Use of “www.trademark.com”: the Application of Principles of Trademark Law to 
Internet Domain Name Disputes, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 455, 461 (1997); Stewart, Internet 
Domain Names, supra note 2. 
 15 Stewart, Internet Domain Names, supra note 2. 
 16 Registrars are companies that “sell” domain names to Internet users, allowing them 
to have a “domain name . . . associated with the computer on the Internet [that users] 
designate during the period the registration is in effect.  From that computer, [users] can 
create a website which will be accessible to Internet users around the world.” ICANN—
FAQs, http://www.icann.org/en/faq (last visited Nov. 3, 2009). 
 17 Id. 
 18 Initially, the DNS was maintained by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 
(“IANA”) under the auspices of the U.S. government. Improvement of Technical 
Management of Internet and Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 8,826, 8,826 (Feb. 20, 
1998) [hereinafter Green Paper]; Diane Cabell, Overview of Domain Name Policy, 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/udrp/overview.html (last updated Apr. 20, 2000).  As the 
Internet grew in size, the task of maintaining the DNS became too large for IANA, and it 
was contracted to Network Solutions Inc. (“NSI”), a private company. Id. 
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expanded international presence.19  In 1998, a new independent 
nonprofit corporation named the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) was created to manage the DNS, 
accredit domain name registrars, and oversee the UDRP.20 
Registering a domain name is a relatively simple process: if a 
user requests a domain name that is not already registered, the user 
is allowed to register the name (for a small fee).21  This “first 
come, first served” procedure quickly created issues for owners of 
trademarks, as domain names are unique and can be held by only a 
single individual.22  Many trademark owners who were not early 
adopters of the Internet and who later tried to register their 
trademark as a domain name found that the name had already been 
 19 White Paper, supra note 6, at 31,741–42.  Many commentators argue that the U.S. 
still controls ICANN. See Markus Müller, Who Owns the Internet? Ownership as a Legal 
Basis for American Control of the Internet, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 709, 719 (2005) (“[T]he United States, through ICANN, has a grip on the entire 
world by a chain of contracts . . . [T]he most important example of the power that the 
United States and ICANN derive from controlling the root file is the enforcement of the 
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy . . . .”). Entire websites are even 
devoted to monitoring ICANN. See, e.g., ICANNWatch, http://www.icannwatch.org. 
 20 ICANN—About, http://www.icann.org/en/about (last visited Nov. 3, 2009); 
ICANN—FAQs, supra note 16.  ICANN lacks direct ties to any national government to 
ensure its neutrality. ICANN—General Information, http://www.icann.org/tr/english.html 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2009) (“ICANN implemented a Uniform Domain Name Dispute 
Resolution Policy (‘UDRP’), which has been used to resolve more than 5000 disputes 
over the rights to domain names.”). 
 21 See Hestermeyer, supra note 13, at 5. 
 22 Id. at 5–6; Bettinger, supra note 5, § 2.2; see Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme B. 
Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name 
Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 141, 155–56 (2001) (“It is, however, 
the first-come-first-served registration policy for . . . domain names . . . that is the 
primary cause of conflict.  This policy permits ownership of a domain name 
incorporating a trademarked term to reside in someone other than the relevant mark 
owner.”).  The problem is further complicated by the fact that trademarks are not 
exclusive, but can be owned by different parties for use in connection with different 
goods and services. Landau, supra note 14, at 457, 462–63.  Additionally, trademarks are 
territorial, which means that the same mark can theoretically be used for different goods 
in different countries at the same time. See Zohar Efroni, A Barcelona.com Analysis: 
Toward a Better Model for Adjudication of International Domain Name Disputes, 14 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 42–43 (2003) (“[T]rademark law can 
conceptually tolerate identical or similar marks in different territories within the same 
classes of goods and services, typically according to separate legal schemes giving effect 
to such marks. Domain names, by contrast, are both unique and global in nature.”).  
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registered.23  Some of these prior registrants were innocent,24 but 
some (known as “cybersquatters”) had recognized a potential for 
profit in owning domain names of or related to famous 
trademarks25 (e.g., Dell and America Online).26  For the Internet to 
be the global center of commerce the United States and others 
envisioned, cybersquatting needed to be curtailed.27 
2. Trademark Owners and Cybersquatting Prior to the UDRP 
Cybersquatters can profit from owning “famous” domain 
names in a number of ways, but principally by either selling the 
domain name to the trademark owner for an exorbitant amount, or 
by selling advertisements and/or their own goods on the domain 
name (using the “brand name” to attract customers).28  Each of 
these uses relies upon luring unsuspecting users to a website that 
may appear to be, but is not in actuality, related to a well-known 
trademark.  Accordingly, each use creates legal issues for 
trademark owners,29 including potential confusion30 and/or 
 23 See, e.g., Hestermeyer, supra note 13, at 5–6. 
 24 For example, a girl named Tiffany could have registered the domain name “Tiffany” 
for her personal blog before the famous New York jewelry company Tiffany & Co. did 
so.  Situations such as these, however, are not considered true cybersquatting, inasmuch 
as there was no bad faith or profit motive in the registration. See ROBERT P. MERGES, 
PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 757 (4th ed. 2006). 
 25 Bettinger, supra note 5, § 2.2; see also Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection 
Act, S. 1255, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c106:S.1255.IS:= (“[Cybersquatting is] the unauthorized registration or use 
of trademarks as Internet domain names or other identifiers of online locations. . . .”). 
 26 Both America Online and Dell have used the UDRP to recapture domain names. 
MILTON MUELLER, SUCCESS BY DEFAULT: A NEW PROFILE OF DOMAIN NAME TRADEMARK 
DISPUTES UNDER ICANN’S UDRP 1, 8 (June 24, 2002) [hereinafter MUELLER, SUCCESS 
BY DEFAULT], available at http://dcc.syr.edu/markle/markle-report-final.pdf. 
 27 See White Paper, supra note 6, at 31,745; Hestermeyer, supra note 13, at 5–6. 
 28 Bettinger, supra note 5, § 2.2 (“As the holders of these registrations, cybersquatters 
often put the domain names up for auction, or offer them for sale directly to the company 
or person connected with the names, at prices far exceeding the cost of registration.  
Alternatively, they keep the registration and use the name of the person or business 
associated with that domain name to attract business to their own sites.”). 
 29 For more information concerning the intersection of trademark law and domain 
names, see Olivia Maria Baratta & Dana L. Hanaman, A Global Update on the Domain 
Name System and the Law: Alternative Dispute Resolution for Increasing Internet 
Competition—Oh, The Times They Are a-Changin’!, 8 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 325, 
346–54 (2000); Landau, supra note 14, at 463–80.  For purposes of this Note, it is simply 
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dilution of their mark.31  Trademark owners in the U.S. and 
elsewhere have the additional concern that trademark law in their 
countries requires them to actively look for and halt unauthorized 
uses of a trademark (known as “policing”) or risk harming the 
mark’s value, strength, and even validity.32  Thus, a trademark 
owner who ignores the use of its trademark as a domain name by a 
cybersquatter increases the chances that it would not be able to 
successfully assert the trademark against other wrongful users, and 
potentially risks a finding of invalidity if it asserted the trademark 
in a lawsuit. 
Prior to the UDRP’s creation, trademark owners had only two 
options for dealing with cybersquatters: (1) pay the amount the 
cybersquatter demanded and purchase the domain name, or (2) 
commence a legal proceeding to assert rights in the domain 
name.33  The first option was unattractive to trademark owners, 
because it was uncomfortably close to extortion—owners would be 
paying a large amount of money for something they believed they 
important to recognize that trademark law has an effect on the registration and use of 
domain names. 
 30 In the U.S., the test for trademark infringement is “likelihood of confusion,” which 
is normally analyzed using a multi-factor test. See Landau, supra note 14, at 472–76.  
With respect to domain names, the issue is whether customers looking for a specific 
brand would assume a seller using a domain name identical to the brand was the 
company that owned the mark. 
 31 Dilution occurs “if customers or prospective customers see the plaintiff’s famous 
mark used by other persons in a non-confusing way to identify other sources for many 
different goods and services, [because] then the ability of the famous mark to clearly 
identify and distinguish only one source might be ‘diluted’ or weakened.” 4 J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:67 (4th ed. 2009).  
In the domain name setting, dilution would occur if a customer became confused about 
the owner of the domain name, purchased goods from a cybersquatter thinking they were 
made by the brand and lost confidence in the brand, thereby harming its reputation and 
value. See Baratta & Hanaman, supra note 29, at 346–53.  Dilution includes blurring, 
tarnishment, and diminishment. Id. at 351–53. 
 32 See 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 31:38 (“[A] trademark owner may be chargeable 
with the information it might have received had due enquiry been made.  This imposes on 
a trademark owner the duty to police its rights against infringers.” (citation omitted)). 
 33 See Patrick D. Kelley, Note, Emerging Patterns in Arbitration Under the Uniform 
Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 181, 181 (2002) 
(“Before the UDRP went into effect, most trademark-based domain name disputes could 
only be resolved by agreement, court action, or arbitration.”); Bettinger, supra note 5, § 
2.2. 
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owned by virtue of their trademark.34  However, a court challenge 
had significant disadvantages, including: “[t]he territorial nature of 
trademark rights, the lack of a single body of rules governing 
trademark-domain name disputes, the difficulty of locating 
registrants . . . the possibility that different domain name 
registrants own multiple iterations of a preexisting mark,” the 
protracted nature of a judicial proceeding, and the cost.35  For 
example, the trademark owner and the cybersquatter could reside 
in countries that use very different legal systems and have no 
mechanism for resolving such a situation.36  Trademark owners 
also needed a fast resolution of their claims, as each day a 
cybersquatter holds a domain name increases the harm to and/or 
dilution of their trademark, and rapid action is rarely possible in a 
trial.37  The situation is often further complicated by the fact that 
cybersquatters regularly register multiple domain names related to 
or easily confused with a single trademark—all of which the 
trademark owner would want to own—thus increasing the cost of 
either option to the trademark owner.38 
 34 Stacey H. King, The ‘Law That It Deems Applicable:’ ICANN, Dispute Resolution, 
and the Problem of Cybersquatting, 22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 453, 455 (2000); 
Christopher S. Lee, The Development of Arbitration in the Resolution of Internet Domain 
Name Disputes, 7 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2, ¶ 12 (2000) (“Companies also argue that 
cybersquatters are like extortionists, holding a trademark hostage until exorbitant sums 
are exacted.”). 
 35 Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 22, at 156; see Anschell & Lucas, supra note 4, at 
3–4 (discussing early cybersquatting court cases and the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer 
Protection Act (“ACPA”)); Bettinger, supra note 5, § 2.3; Lisa M. Sharrock, The Future 
of Domain Name Dispute Resolution: Crafting Practical International Legal Solutions 
From Within the UDRP Framework, 51 DUKE L.J. 817, 827–28 (2001). 
 36 See Bettinger, supra note 5, § 2.3.  The United States attempted to deal with these 
issues through the ACPA, but it was not as successful as hoped. See Anschell & Lucas, 
supra note 4, at 3–4 (“[T]he statute has not entirely eliminated the jurisdictional 
impediments to the prosecution of cybersquatting cases in the federal courts.”). 
 37 See CADNA—The Coalition Against Domain Name Abuse to Combat 
Cybersquatting, http://complianceandprivacy.com/News-CADNA-campaign.html (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2009) (“The countermeasures available to brand owners are too slow and 
ineffective to respond to [cybersquatters] and often too late to prevent damage to the 
brands and consumers. . . .”). 
 38 Bettinger, supra note 5, § 2.2.  Instead of just registering www.trademark.com, 
cybersquatters often register www.buytrademark.com or a common misspelling of the 
trademark, all of which trademark owners would want to purchase to avoid any 
confusion. Id. 
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Owners were so dissatisfied with their options that they lobbied 
for “streamlined and inexpensive non-national dispute settlement 
alternatives, particularly for . . . cybersquatters.”39  In response, the 
U.S. government directed the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (“WIPO”) to study the problem of cybersquatting and 
to help the newly created ICANN devise a system to resolve 
cybersquatting disputes using traditional ADR systems as a 
model.40  In 1999, ICANN promulgated the UDRP as the primary 
method of resolving issues “arising from alleged abusive 
registrations of domain names (for example, 
cybersquatting) . . . .”41 
B. The UDRP 
1. The Creation of the UDRP 
The UDRP was not the first attempt to solve the cybersquatting 
problem using ADR.42  A single registrar had previously created 
its own system of ADR for cybersquatting disputes, in an effort to 
avoid being brought into lawsuits between trademark owners and 
cybersquatters.43  Once more registrars were accredited, however, 
 39 Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 22, at 156; Hestermeyer, supra note 13, at 9 (“The 
trademark lobby asserted that domain names posed a myriad of new and cheap ways to 
effectively infringe on trademarks.”). 
 40 Hestermeyer, supra note 13, at 18–19.  WIPO issued a report in 1999 advocating the 
use of ADR to hear domain name and trademark related cases. WIPO, Final Report of the 
WIPO Internet Domain Name Process (Apr. 30, 1999) [hereinafter WIPO Paper], 
available at http://www.icann.org/en/wipo/wipo-report.htm; Bettinger supra note 5, § 3.2 
(“The Final Report of the WIPO . . . recommended the creation of an online 
administrative dispute resolution procedure.”); see MICHAEL GEIST, FAIR.COM?: AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE ALLEGATIONS OF SYSTEMATIC UNFAIRNESS IN THE ICANN UDRP 1, 
12–14 (Aug. 2001) [hereinafter GEIST, FAIR.COM], available at http://aix1.uottawa.ca/ 
~geist/geistudrp.pdf  (discussing the process by which the UDRP was formed). 
 41 ICANN—Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policies, http://www.icann.org/ 
en/udrp (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). 
 42 For a discussion of the history of ADR and domain names, see Helfer & Dinwoodie, 
supra note 22, at 157–64. 
 43 For a more detailed discussion of this early domain name ADR system, see GEIST, 
FAIR.COM, supra note 40, at 9–17.  The registrar NSI created a rudimentary dispute 
resolution system after being sued numerous times by irate trademark owners who had 
been victimized by cybersquatters.  This system was heavily criticized. Id. at 9–12; see 
Landau, supra note 14, at 480–85. 
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the U.S. government decided that cybersquatting was so pervasive 
that it was necessary to create a new ADR system dedicated to 
hearing cybersquatting claims.44 
The U.S. government initially directed WIPO to investigate the 
elements necessary for an ADR system that would resolve only 
“disputes about cybersquatting and cyberpiracy and not . . . 
disputes between two parties with legitimate competing interests in 
a particular mark.”45  Using classic arbitration was considered but 
dismissed on the grounds that it does not allow for judicial review 
of decisions, an element that WIPO considered crucial to ensure 
the fairness of the new process.46  WIPO therefore concluded that 
an entirely new system of ADR was required.47 
Following the presentation of WIPO’s final report, ICANN 
convened panels of experts in trademark and Internet law to draft 
the UDRP.48  After the initial meetings, ICANN published 
proposed rules and accepted Notes49 before enacting the UDRP on 
October 24, 1999.50  Since elements of different ADR systems 
were used to create the final product, the UDRP is a somewhat 
unique form of ADR that has been called “a new legal creature 
unlike any of its international dispute settlement antecedents.”51 
 44 See Green Paper, supra note 18, at 8,830; White Paper, supra note 6, at 31,750. 
 45 White Paper, supra note 6, at 31,747.  The White Paper goes on to state that, 
“[w]here legitimate competing rights are concerned, disputes are rightly settled in an 
appropriate court.” Id.; see also GEIST, FAIR.COM, supra note 40, at 12–13. 
 46 WIPO Paper, supra note 40, ¶ 139–40.  WIPO’s final report to ICANN states that 
“arbitration and mediation . . . have a role and should be considered as valuable 
procedures for the resolution of domain name disputes.” Id. ¶ 151(ii). 
 47 See Bettinger, supra note 5, § 3; Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 22, at 171–73. 
 48 Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 22, at 179; ICANN—Implementation Schedule for 
Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp-
schedule.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2009). 
 49 See ICANN, Staff Report on Implementation Documents for the Uniform Dispute 
Resolution Policy (Sept. 29, 1999), http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/staff-report-
29sept99.htm [hereinafter ICANN, First Staff Report]. 
 50 ICANN—Implementation Schedule, supra note 48. 
 51 Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 22, at 149.  There is an argument that the UDRP 
also borrows from judicial and ministerial systems; however, the Policy is much closer to 
that of ADR systems, especially in its rules and procedures. See id. 
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2. UDRP Rules and Policies 
The UDRP is technically a “mandatory administrative 
proceeding,”52 because ICANN requires domain name registrars to 
include a clause in all registration agreements stating that the 
registrant agrees that all claims involving cybersquatting or bad 
faith registration will be decided pursuant to the UDRP.53  All 
other claims involving domain names are left to other means of 
resolution.54  UDRP proceedings typically last fourteen days 
(absent “exceptional circumstances”)55 and are decided solely on 
the basis of the parties’ written statements (in-person hearings are 
effectively precluded).56  Panels are told to be fair and impartial57 
and to base their decisions on the UDRP’s limited guidance, the 
parties’ written statements and supporting documentation, any 
provider-specific rules, and “any rules and principles of law that 
[the panel] deems applicable.”58 
 52 ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (Oct. 24, 1999), 
http://www.icann.org/en/dndr/udrp/policy.htm [hereinafter UDRP Policy]; see also 
Bettinger, supra note 5, § 4.4. 
 53 ICANN, Registrar Accreditation Agreement § 3.8 (May 17, 2001), 
http://www.icann.org/en/registrars/ra-agreement-17may01.htm; see also Hestermeyer, 
supra note 13, at 25–26.  The UDRP, therefore, is essentially a product of contract law. 
 54 ICANN, Second Staff Report on Implementation Documents for the Uniform 
Dispute Resolution Policy § 4.1(c) (Oct. 24, 1999), http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp-
second-staff-report-24oct99.htm [hereinafter ICANN, Second Staff Report]; see Helfer & 
Dinwoodie, supra note 22, at 152.  More difficult issues concerning domain names and 
trademarks, such as two legitimate trademark owners wanting the same domain name, are 
left to the courts. ICANN, FAQS, supra note 16 (“In disputes arising from registrations 
allegedly made abusively (such as ‘cyber-squatting’ and ‘cyber-piracy’), the uniform 
policy provides an expedited administrative procedure to allow the dispute to be resolved 
without the cost and delays often encountered in court litigation.”). 
 55 ICANN, Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy 15(b) (Oct. 
24, 1999), http://www.icann.org/en/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm [hereinafter “UDRP 
Rules”]. 
 56 Id. at 13.  The rules state that “[t]here shall be no in-person hearings (including 
hearings by teleconference, videoconference, and web conference), unless the Panel 
determines, in its sole discretion and as an exceptional matter, that such a hearing is 
necessary for deciding the complaint.” Id.  In practice, panels rarely, if ever, decide that a 
hearing is necessary. 
 57 Id. at 10(b) (“In all cases, the Panel shall ensure that the Parties are treated with 
equality and that each Party is given a fair opportunity to present its case.”). 
 58 Id. at 15(a). 
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A UDRP proceeding commences when a trademark owner files 
a complaint against a domain name owner with one of the 
organizations approved by ICANN to adjudicate UDRP claims (a 
“provider”).59  To proceed, a complaint must meet all of the 
procedural and substantive rules promulgated by ICANN and the 
chosen provider.60  In general, the claimant must demonstrate 
ownership of a valid trademark61 and show: 
(1) how the domain name(s) is/are identical or 
confusingly similar to [the complainant’s] 
trademark or service mark . . . and (2) why the 
Respondent [has] . . . no rights or legitimate 
interests in . . . the domain name(s) . . . and (3) why 
the domain name(s) should be considered as having 
been registered and being used in bad faith.62 
Bad faith registration and use of a domain name is defined via 
a non-exhaustive list of examples, including: (1) “acquir[ing] the 
domain name primarily . . . [to] sell[], rent[], or transfer[]” it for 
valuable consideration to the trademark owner; (2) registering the 
domain name to preclude the trademark owner from doing so, 
“provided that [the domain owner has] engaged in a pattern of such 
conduct”; (3) registering the domain name primarily to damage a 
competitor; or (4) registering the domain name to lure Internet 
users seeking a trademark owner’s product to the registrant’s 
website for commercial gain.63  The complainant must also remit 
 59 Id. at 3(a).  Currently, four organizations are approved as providers: WIPO, the 
National Arbitration Foundation (“NAF”), the Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution 
Centre (“ADNDRC”) and, most recently, the Czech Arbitration Court (“CAC”). 
ICANN—Approved Providers for Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, 
http://www.icann.org/en/dndr/udrp/approved-providers.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2009).  
Each provider has its own supplemental rules and fee structure. Id.  The supplemental 
rules are largely procedural, do not affect the content of this Note, and therefore will not 
be discussed. 
 60 UDRP Rules, supra note 55, at 3(a). 
 61 Id. at 3(b)(viii) (“Specify the trademark(s) or service mark(s) on which the 
complaint is based and, for each mark, describe the goods or services, if any, with which 
the mark is used. . . .”). 
 62 Id. at 3(b)(ix).  Most of the other requirements for a complaint are procedural and 
therefore not relevant to this discussion. Id. at 3. 
 63 UDRP Policy, supra note 52, § 4(b).  The panel may find bad faith on other facts or 
for other reasons. Id. 
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all fees and state whether it prefers one or three members on the 
panel that will decide the claim.64 
The domain name holder or “respondent” must submit a 
written response to a complaint within twenty days or be in 
default.65  This response must “[r]espond[] specifically to the 
statements and allegations contained in the complaint and include 
any and all bases for [the respondent’s right] to retain registration 
and use of the disputed domain name. . . .”66  It should also include 
an explanation as to why the respondent is a “legitimate owner,” 
another term defined via a non-exclusive list of examples.67  If a 
complainant chose a single member panel, the respondent may 
instead elect a three-member panel, but must share the additional 
cost equally with the complainant.68  If a single panelist is used, 
the provider selects the panelist; if a three-person panel is used, 
each party selects a panelist and the provider selects the third.69  
Either party may institute a court proceeding at any time while a 
 64 Id. § 4(g) (“All fees charged by a Provider in connection with any dispute before an 
Administrative Panel pursuant to this Policy shall be paid by the complainant, except in 
[a specific, enumerated] case[] . . . .”).  A three-member panel is more expensive than a 
single person panel; however, many believe it to be fairer. See, e.g., GEIST, FAIR.COM, 
supra note 40, at 3. 
 65 UDRP Rules, supra note 55, at 5(a)–(b). 
 66 Id. at 5(b)(i). 
 67 UDRP Policy, supra note 52, § 4(c).  The non-exclusive list of examples of a 
“legitimate owner” includes: 
(i) [respondent’s] use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the 
domain name . . . in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or 
services; or 
(ii) [that respondent has] . . . been commonly known by the domain 
name, even if [it has] acquired no trademark or service mark rights; 
or 
(iii) [the respondent is] making a legitimate noncommercial or fair 
use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to 
misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service 
mark at issue. 
Id. 
 68 UDRP Rules, supra note 55, at 5(b)(iv), 5(c).  If the respondent does not object, the 
complainant’s choice prevails. Id. at 5(c). 
 69 Id. at 6(b)–(e).  If a three-member panel is chosen, each party submits a list with 
several potential panelists, and the provider chooses a panelist from each party’s list 
unless “the provider is unable” to do so, in which case the provider chooses all panelists. 
Id. at 6(e).  Providers choose panelists from a publicly available list. Id. at 6(a). 
VOL19_BOOK4_WOODARD 11/16/2009  5:53:20 AM 
2009] ADR, ARBITRATION & THE UDRP 1183 
.”  
 
complaint is pending,70 and the losing party may appeal a panel’s 
decision to a court of mutual jurisdiction.71  If a losing respondent 
does not appeal within ten days of the decision, ICANN instructs 
the domain name registrar to transfer ownership of the domain 
name to the complainant.72  Decisions must be fully reasoned73 
and are published by the providers on “a publicly accessible 
website,” usually their own.74  In an “exceptional case,” the panel 
may “redact portions of its decision 75
C. Alternative Dispute Resolution, Arbitration, and the UDRP 
The term “ADR” encompasses all methods of dispute 
resolution in which the parties choose a process other than 
traditional litigation, including mediation, negotiation, arbitration, 
and the UDRP.76  All methods of ADR share certain features, from 
goals such as resolving a dispute faster, easier, and cheaper than 
would be possible through litigation77 to being subjected to 
scrutiny and criticism.78  As noted above, the UDRP was 
developed by combining elements from a number of existing 
 70 Id. at 18(a).  If parties choose to proceed to court while a UDRP action is pending, 
the panel must decide whether to continue and render a decision or stay the UDRP 
proceeding. Id. 
 71 UDRP Policy, supra note 52, § 4(k). 
 72 Id.  The respondent accordingly loses all rights to the domain name. 
 73 UDRP Rules, supra note 55, at 15(d). 
 74 Id. at 16(b).  Many decisions may be found at ICANN’s website. ICANN—List of 
Proceedings Under the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 
http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/proceedings-list.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2009). 
 75 UDRP Policy, supra note 52, § 4(j). 
 76 Charles P. Lickson, The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Intellectual 
Property, Technology-Related or Innovation-Based Disputes, 55 AM. JUR. TRIALS 483, §§ 
1–2 (1995).  Some forms of ADR have been in use for hundreds of years. STEPHEN B. 
GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION—NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER 
PROCESSES 6 (5th ed. 2007) (“Arbitration has been used throughout the world for 
centuries. . . .”). 
 77 A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around 
the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 101 (2000) [hereinafter Froomkin, Wrong 
Turn] (“ICANN’s objective in promoting [the UDRP] was to produce a rapid, 
lightweight, and inexpensive process that would allow victims of cybersquatting to 
vindicate their rights far more cheaply and quickly that would be possible in most 
courts.”). NAT’L INST. FOR TRIAL ADVOCACY, THE ARBITRATOR’S HANDBOOK, ch. 1, § 
1.1.2 (2nd ed. 2005) (discussing the benefits of arbitration). 
 78 See GOLDBERG, supra note 76, at 8–9. 
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systems of ADR and so is somewhat unique.79  Of the traditional 
ADR systems, the UDRP most closely resembles arbitration, but 
its hybrid heritage resulted in a number of important differences 
from traditional arbitration.80 
In fact, a significant difference between the two systems occurs 
even before a dispute arises; as, unlike in the UDRP, parties to an 
arbitration proceeding typically have a contractual relationship 
prior to the dispute and an “arbitration clause” included in that 
contract.81  An arbitration clause requires the parties to submit all 
or certain types of disputes for adjudication via arbitration and to 
forego their right to a judicial remedy.82  The clause usually sets 
forth procedural rules for the arbitration, including: the arbitration 
organization83 that will oversee the dispute (similar to the provider 
under the UDRP); which disputes are covered by the clause; the 
law that will control in the proceeding (i.e., the “governing law”); 
the rules the arbitrators will follow in hearing a dispute; the 
number of arbitrators who will decide the case; and how those 
arbitrators will be chosen.84  As noted above, the parties to a 
UDRP proceeding generally have no relationship, contractual or 
otherwise (except for a desire to own the same domain name), 
 79 See supra text accompanying note 51. 
 80 Richard E. Speidel, ICANN Domain Name Dispute Resolution, the Revised Uniform 
Arbitration Act, and the Limitations of Modern Arbitration Law, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING 
BUS. L. 167, 171–72 (2002); Stephen J. Ware, Domain-Name Arbitration in the 
Arbitration-Law Context: Consent to, and Fairness in, the UDRP, 6 J. SMALL & 
EMERGING BUS. L. 145, 159–64 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=992356. 
 81 See GOLDBERG, supra note 76, at 213; Speidel, supra note 80, at 172 (“American 
arbitration legislation . . . requires a written agreement between the parties to a 
transaction or a controversy to submit future or existing disputes to arbitrators for 
decision.”).  Some have argued that consumer arbitration is the exception, because the 
arbitration clauses resemble contracts of adhesion due to the consumer’s inability to 
negotiate terms. See Ware, supra note 80, at 148. 
 82 See GOLDBERG, supra note 76, at 213 (discussing the general arbitration process). 
 83 Each provider has its own procedural rules the parties agree to follow. Id.  A few of 
the most common arbitration providers are the American Arbitration Association 
(“AAA”), http://www.adr.org; the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”), 
http://www.iccwbo.org; and JAMS, http://www.jamsadr.com. 
 84 Speidel, supra note 80, at 172.  Arbitration organizations such as JAMS provide 
sample arbitration clauses and lists of information that should be included in arbitration 
clauses. See, e.g., JAMS, GUIDE TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES FOR COMMERCIAL 
CONTRACTS (revised Aug. 2006), available at http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/ 
Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_Commercial_Arbitration_Clauses-2006.pdf. 
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prior to the commencement of a proceeding, and therefore will 
never have agreed in advance on any procedural elements of a 
proceeding.85  In both systems, parties to a proceeding must 
choose a “provider,” an organization that oversees the proceeding 
and whose rules are used.  However, in arbitration, parties 
typically agree on the provider before any dispute and include their 
choice in the arbitration clause of their cont 86
In addition, arbitration typically resembles traditional 
litigation87 more than the UDRP does, in that it requires in-person 
hearings (including witness testimony and evidence presentation) 
and limited discovery.88  This generally ensures that arbitration 
will be a longer and more involved process than a UDRP 
proceeding.89  Some of that potential additional time is removed by 
the fact that an arbitration panel’s decision is final and virtually 
unappealable,90 whereas the UDRP explicitly allows parties to 
appeal to court91 for a de novo review of the claim.92  The final 
 85 See Speidel, supra note 80, at 173. 
 86 See GOLDBERG, supra note 76, at 213–16 (describing the basic features of arbitration 
that most if not all arbitration providers implement in their rules).  Most arbitration 
providers are similar, and the choice is often a matter of preference.  One of the most 
prominent international arbitration organizations is the ICC.  The long history of ICC 
arbitration, its prominence in the field, and the facts that its rules were designed for 
international conflicts and are typical of most other arbitration providers’ rules makes it 
an ideal choice for comparison with the UDRP. See ICC, INT’L COURT OF ARBITRATION, 
RESOLVING BUSINESS DISPUTES WORLDWIDE (2009), available at 
http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/Court/Arbitration/810_Anglais_05.pdf.  
Arbitrations under the auspices of the ICC have the same general structure as the classic 
arbitration discussed above, but also follow rules promulgated by the ICC. 
 87 Lickson, supra note 76, § 2 (“[A]rbitration amounts to a private trial . . . .”). 
 88 See GOLDBERG, supra note 76, at 213; see also American Arbitration Association, 
Arbitration & Mediation, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28749 (last visited Nov. 3, 2008) 
(“Arbitration is the submission of a dispute to one or more impartial persons for a final 
and binding decision, known as an award.”). 
 89 Compare David E. Sorkin, Judicial Review of ICANN Domain Name Dispute 
Decisions, 18 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 36 (2001) (“[A]rbitration can 
be quite . . . drawn out . . . .”), with MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 24, at 753–
54 (describing the short timeline for UDRP proceedings). 
 90 Speidel, supra note 80, at 175 (“Judicial review [of arbitration awards in America] is 
limited to stated statutory (and sharply limited nonstatutory) grounds aimed primarily at 
partiality, abuse, or excess of authority by the arbitrators or other serious procedural 
irregularities.”); see also Sorkin, supra note 89, at 37. 
 91 UDRP Rules, supra note 55, at 3. The parties may appeal to a court of “[m]utual 
[j]urisdiction [, which] means a court jurisdiction at the location of either (a) the principal 
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difference is that arbitration decisions are usually confidential, 
whereas UDRP decisions are public.93 
Despite these differences, traditional arbitration and the UDRP 
share a sufficient number of characteristics94 to make a comparison 
of them useful.  By comparing the UDRP to the more established 
arbitration, it becomes easier to see how the UDRP can be “fixed” 
easily.  
II. CRITICISMS OF THE UDRP AND THEIR MERITS 
Given the importance of domain names to the Internet, it is not 
surprising that the UDRP has been subject to intense scrutiny since 
it was adopted.95  Scholars have analyzed nearly every aspect of 
the UDRP—from the rules themselves96 to statistical breakdowns 
of outcomes.97  As mentioned supra Part I, however, most of these 
critiques of the UDRP do not consider it in its proper context as a 
system of ADR and consequently are very negative.98  The long 
history of ADR and arbitration means that most of the criticisms 
scholars now aim at the UDRP have already been addressed (at 
least to some degree) in the context of ADR and/or arbitration.99  
office of the Registrar . . . or (b) the domain-name holder’s address as shown . . . in 
Registrar’s Whois database at the time the complaint is submitted to the Provider.” Id. at 
1. 
 92 Speidel, supra note 80, at 175; Ware, supra note 80, at 162–64. 
 93 Compare ICC, International Court of Arbitration, supra note 86, at 4 (“Arbitration 
hearings are not public, and only the parties themselves receive copies of the awards.”), 
with ICANN—List of Proceedings Under the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution 
Policy, supra note 74. 
 94 Speidel, supra note 80, at 171–72 (“The UDRP procedure . . . contains some 
elements that are consistent with arbitration . . . .”); see Ware, supra note 80, at 159–64 
(discussing the similarities and differences between the UDRP and arbitration). 
 95 Websites have even been created to monitor, discuss, and/or analyze UDRP 
opinions. E.g., UDRPinfo.com, http://www.udrpinfo.com. 
 96 See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, ICANN’S “Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy”—
Causes and (Partial) Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 605, 695 (2002) [hereinafter Froomkin, 
ICANN’s UDRP] (discussing UDRP Rule 17(b)). 
 97 See generally GEIST, FAIR.COM, supra note 40, at 6. 
 98 There are two notable exceptions. See Speidel, supra note 80, at 146; Ware, supra 
note 80, at 168. 
 99 See Ware, supra note 80, at 146 (“[A]ssessing issues of consent and fairness in 
domain-name arbitration should be done in the context of assessing those issues in 
arbitration generally.”). 
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A fair evaluation of the criticisms of the UDRP, then, must also 
examine how arbitration or other ADR systems have responded to 
similar claims. 
When examined in comparison with ADR, it is clear that, 
although some of the criticisms of the UDRP have merit, others 
merely demonstrate a lack of understanding of ADR.  When the 
UDRP is placed in its proper context as a method of ADR, it 
becomes apparent why certain aspects of the UDRP function as 
they do.  Some of the facts relied upon by the UDRP’s critics show 
that the UDRP is actually an ADR system with a very limited 
scope that is performing in the intended manner.100  Other 
criticisms, however, have merit and for these the question becomes 
whether ADR principles can be used to “correct” the problem. 
This Note applies ADR principles to the UDRP in two ways.  
When analyzing the validity of the criticisms of the UDRP, ADR 
principles are used to dismiss certain criticisms as invalid.  For 
criticisms that are unique to the UDRP or cannot be refuted easily 
by ADR principles, ADR is used as a model from which potential 
solutions can be derived.  The principal criticisms of the UDRP 
raised by most critics are that: (1) it is biased in favor of trademark 
owners; (2) panelists are given too much freedom; and (3) it should 
have an appellate system.101 
A. The UDRP is Biased in Favor of Trademark Owners 
The fundamental issue underlying much of the criticism of the 
UDRP is a belief that it is inherently biased in favor of trademark 
owners—a position that is even shared by some of its 
supporters.102  Those who hold this position generally cite the fact 
that trademark owners prevail in as much as 85% of proceedings as 
 100 See, e.g., M. Scott Donahey, The UDRP—Fundamentally Fair, But Far From 
Perfect, 6 ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP. (BNA) 937 (Aug. 29, 2001) [hereinafter Donahey, 
The UDRP—Fundamentally Fair], available at http://www.scottdonahey.com/ 
Publications/UDRP_far_from_perfect.pdf (“The UDRP procedure is far from perfect, but 
it is not unfair.”). 
 101 See generally GEIST, FAIR.COM, supra note 40. 
 102 See, e.g., Kelley, supra note 33, at 182–83 (“The most common criticism of the 
UDRP is that the policy is biased in favor of trademark owners . . . .”). 
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all but conclusive “proof” of such bias.103  Whether or not the 
UDRP is actually biased, this conclusion is at best an 
oversimplification.  The statistics can also be seen as an indication 
that the UDRP is fulfilling its primary purpose: to return domain 
names registered by cybersquatters to trademark owners.104  In 
order to determine whether the UDRP is actually biased, and what 
to do if so, it is essential to first explore the underlying aspects of 
the UDRP that contribute to the perception that it is biased. 
As described infra, it is likely that many of the specific aspects 
of the UDRP that are often considered biased in favor of trademark 
owners do not actually create bias in the UDRP as a practical 
matter.  This does not mean that the perception that the UDRP is 
biased should not be addressed.  A perception that a dispute 
resolution system is biased (even if that perception is inaccurate) 
makes it difficult for the dispute resolution system to be an 
effective, fair way to resolve disputes.  Accordingly, steps should 
be taken to increase the actual and perceived fairness of the UDRP. 
1. Time Limits Favor Complainants 
The first aspect of the UDRP that many commentators believe 
contributes to a fundamental bias is the difference between the 
time limits given to complainants and respondents.105  The UDRP 
gives respondents twenty days to respond to a complaint and ten 
days to appeal an adverse judgment to a court before losing the 
domain name.106  A complainant, on the other hand, may file a 
 103 See id.; Brian Livingston, Perspective: Groups Cite Bias in Domain Name 
Arbitration, CNET NEWS, July 7, 2000, http://www.news.com/2010-1071-281335.html 
(discussing allegations of bias in the UDRP); Posting of Peter Lattman to Wall Street 
Journal Law Blog, Domain Name Disputes at an All Time High, http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
law/2008/01/11/domain-name-disputes-at-an-all-time-high (Jan. 11, 2008, 14:16 EST).  
The 85% wining rate refers to UDRP actions brought to WIPO. Id.  As of May 10, 2004, 
ICANN indicated that the complainant had prevailed in 10,719 of 13,311 claims, and 640 
decisions had been split. ICANN, Statistical Summary of Proceedings Under Uniform 
Dispute Resolution Policy (May 10, 2004), http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/proceedings-
stat.htm. See generally GEIST, FAIR.COM, supra note 40, at 3. 
 104 See BRANTHOVER, supra note 7, at 7. 
 105 Froomkin, ICANN’s UDRP, supra note 96, at 674–78. 
 106 UDRP Rules, supra note 55, at 5(a); UDRP Policy, supra note 52, § 4(k).  If the 
lawsuit is properly filed, the domain name is not transferred to the complainant until the 
court proceeding has been completed.  Both the response and the filing of a lawsuit 
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complaint or begin a lawsuit at any time; the only limit is any 
applicable statute of limitations.107  Commentators have argued 
that these distinctions reflect a “fundamental asymmetry” in the 
UDRP that renders the process unfair.108  Asymmetries of this 
nature, however, do not necessarily indicate bias or unfairness; 
they may just be a practical necessity.109  In the context of the 
UDRP, the asymmetry with respect to timing is not indicative of 
bias, but is in fact a byproduct of the UDRP’s mandate to provide a 
fast, inexpensive forum for resolving cybersquatting claims.110 
More importantly, these commentators overlook the fact that 
the complaining party almost always determines when an 
adversarial proceeding (whether litigation or arbitration) will 
begin, and that time limits are a necessary part of the adversarial 
process.111  The need for a defined time period within which a 
respondent must answer a complaint is obvious; without deadlines 
(and consequences for ignoring such deadlines) most respondents 
require respondents to submit a legal document containing certain elements that support 
their right to retain the domain name in question.  The UDRP rules do not require either 
party to utilize an attorney in preparing their submissions, but the required elements may 
prove difficult for a layperson to complete effectively. See UDRP Policy, supra note 52, 
§§ 4(c), 4(k); MILTON MUELLER, ROUGH JUSTICE: AN ANALYSIS OF ICANN’S UNIFORM 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY 19, available at http://dcc.syr.edu/miscarticles/ 
roughjustice.pdf [hereinafter MUELLER, ROUGH JUSTICE]; Thornburg, supra note 8, at 
215. 
 107 See UDRP Rules, supra note 55, at 3(a), 18. 
 108 Froomkin, supra note 96, at 678.  Froomkin suggests that the problem with time 
limits is compounded by ICANN’s decision not to require actual notice of a UDRP 
action. Id. at 674, 702.  Actual notice, however, is a very high standard, and is especially 
difficult given the fact that (as Froomkin freely admits) many cybersquatters hide their 
identities to make contacting them difficult, if not impossible. Id. at 674–75.  If actual 
notice were required, it would incentivize cybersquatters to hide their information more 
diligently and make bringing a UDRP action even more difficult. 
 109 An example can be found in golf, specifically that women’s tees are placed closer to 
the green than men’s tees to compensate for perceived differences between the genders.  
See William O. Blaney, Placement of Markers, USGA J. & TURF MGMT. 19, 21 (Sept. 
1954), available at http://turf.lib.msu.edu/1950s/1954/540919.pdf. 
 110 ICANN—General Information, supra note 20. 
 111 Any proceeding, whether in court or ADR, begins when one of the parties files a 
claim.  The moving party’s actions are limited only by an external statute of limitations 
and/or a contractual agreement in the case of ADR.  The other party must respond to the 
moving party’s actions within a certain time period or be considered defaulting. See, e.g., 
FED. R. CIV. P. 3. 
VOL19_BOOK4_WOODARD 11/16/2009  5:53:20 AM 
1190 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 19:1169 
 
would have little or no incentive to ever answer a complaint.112  
While the rules of most arbitration providers give respondents 
thirty days to answer a complaint, it is difficult to see how a 
difference of ten or even twenty days creates inherent bias in the 
UDRP.113  It is especially hard to argue that these time limits result 
in bias in the context of the UDRP, where the majority of 
respondents are cybersquatters who either have the ability to 
respond in a timely manner or no desire to respond at all.114  In 
fact, setting aggressive time limits may be more important for 
UDRP claims than in other circumstances, as a true cybersquatter 
has a distinct financial incentive to delay a proceeding for as long 
as possible in order to continue profiting from the use of the 
contested domain name.115  However, an argument can be made 
that the UDRP’s time limits are too short if the respondent is a 
legitimate domain name owner (an “innocent respondent”).116  
These innocent respondents lack experience with the UDRP or an 
abundance of resources and arguably should be given additional 
time to answer or appeal.117  Yet, as there is no way to sort these 
innocent respondents from cybersquatters, any additional time 
given to an “innocent” respondent would by necessity apply to all 
respondents, and so any extension of the time periods needs to be 
balanced against a trademark owner’s legitimate need for speedy 
 112 Usually, someone being sued would prefer the status quo to continue for as long as 
possible. 
 113 See, e.g., ICC, RULES OF ARBITRATION art. 5, § 1 (2009) (rules in force as of Jan. 1, 
1998) [hereinafter “ICC RULES”], available at http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/ 
Court/Arbitration/other/rules_arb_english.pdf. 
 114 See Froomkin, ICANN’s UDRP, supra note 96, at 675; MUELLER, SUCCESS BY 
DEFAULT, supra note 26, at iii. 
 115 Every day the proceeding is delayed, a cybersquatter can earn money through the 
use of ads on a website connected to the domain name in controversy.  See Google 
AdSense, https://www.google.com/adsense/login/en_US/index.html (last visited Nov. 15, 
2009) (offering a free program to website publishers to add ads to their websites). 
 116 Froomkin, ICANN’s UDRP, supra note 96, at 675 (“The time problem is especially 
acute for consumers and small or medium enterprises (‘SMEs’) that do not have an 
Internet-savvy intellectual property lawyer on retainer, or indeed any lawyer at all.”); 
MUELLER, SUCCESS BY DEFAULT, supra note 26, at 16–17 (“An unacceptably large 
number of defaults appear to be cases in which . . . the respondents appear to have a 
colorable claim to the disputed name.”). 
 117 Froomkin, ICANN’s UDRP, supra note 96, at 674–76. 
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resolutions of domain name controversies.118  The existing time 
limits in the UDRP may thus be seen as a reasonable compromise 
that balances the interests of both parties and the abilities of both 
classes of respondents.  More, there is no evidence that additional 
time would be fairer to the only class of respondents who could 
legitimately benefit from it.  Accordingly, the time limits in the 
UDRP do not appear to be the source of, or the answer to, any 
perceived bias in the UDRP. 
2. Frequency of Default Judgments 
Another aspect of the UDRP that commentators often cite as 
contributing to a bias in favor of trademark owners is the rules 
concerning default judgments.119  If a domain name owner does 
not respond to a complaint within the prescribed time period, the 
UDRP requires that claims be decided using only the complaint.120  
As a result, default judgments occur quite often in UDRP 
proceedings.121  Commentators have argued that this rule virtually 
guarantees complainants a victory, because the panel’s decision in 
such circumstances is based entirely on documents written or 
supplied by the complainant “without any input or participation 
from respondents or respondents’ lawyers.”122 
This again is not a “problem” with the UDRP that creates a 
bias, but another unavoidable aspect of an adversarial process.  All 
legal systems define the consequences if one party to a complaint 
fails to appear, and many of them are similar to the UDRP’s in that 
they allow the case to proceed without the participation of the non-
 118 Unlike claims in other areas where a complainant’s damages may not be affected by 
the passage of time, or may only be slightly affected, every day that a cybersquatter holds 
a domain name can increase the harm to a legitimate trademark owner’s brand from 
confusion, dilution, or any of the other harms mentioned supra Part I. 
 119 See MUELLER, SUCCESS BY DEFAULT, supra note 26, at 14–15 (“A ‘default’ occurs 
when a defendant in a domain name dispute fails to file any response to the complaint 
within the . . . time limit.”). 
 120 UDRP Policy, supra note 52, § 4; UDRP Rules, supra note 55, at 5(e). 
 121 MICHAEL GEIST, FUNDAMENTALLY FAIR.COM?  AN UPDATE ON BIAS ALLEGATIONS 
AND THE ICANN UDRP 5–9, available at http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~geist/fairupdate.pdf 
[hereinafter GEIST, FUNDAMENTALLY FAIR.COM]; MUELLER, SUCCESS BY DEFAULT, supra 
note 26, at 14–15. 
 122 MUELLER, SUCCESS BY DEFAULT, supra note 26, at 14. 
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appearing party.123  More, it certainly is not unusual that the party 
who participates in a proceeding prevails, as “in civil litigation . . . 
in a default situation, the plaintiff/complainant prevails more than 
90% of the time.”124 
The fact that the UDRP resolves a large percentage of claims 
via default judgments (one study found that 54% of UDRP claims 
result in default judgments125) and that most of those default 
judgments favor the complainant (96% in the same study126) is not 
necessarily an indication that the UDRP is unfair.127  Another 
equally reasonable explanation for these statistics is that most 
respondents are cybersquatters who know when they are violating 
the UDRP and choose not to waste time or money responding to a 
complaint they know they will lose.128  One study even placed the 
default rate for known cybersquatters at close to 100%.129 
Although cybersquatter defaults should not raise concerns 
about bias, the situation is more complicated when the defaulter is 
“innocent” (i.e., not a cybersquatter), a situation that appears to 
occur fairly regularly.130  Innocent defaulters are people who 
registered a domain name in good faith and are not using it in a 
 123 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 55. 
 124 Donahey, The UDRP—Fundamentally Fair, supra note 100, at 1.  Donahey argues 
that Michael Geist’s methodology for analyzing the statistics of default cases under the 
UDRP is flawed and suggests that the default judgments do not affect the Policy’s 
fairness. See generally id. 
 125 GEIST, FUNDAMENTALLY FAIR.COM, supra note 121, at 7.  An earlier study found that 
52% of cases result in default, which “would indicate that the rate of default has been 
increasing over time.” MUELLER, SUCCESS BY DEFAULT, supra note 26, at 15.  However, 
there does not appear to have been a comprehensive study on defaults performed in the 
last year or two. 
 126 GEIST, FUNDAMENTALLY FAIR.COM, supra note 121, at 7. 
 127 See generally Donahey, The UDRP—Fundamentally Fair, supra note 100 (rebutting 
Michael Geist’s study and arguing that the default rate does not demonstrate that the 
UDRP is unfair). 
 128 See MUELLER, SUCCESS BY DEFAULT, supra note 26, at 15–16 (“A large portion of 
defaults in UDRP cases represent the flushing out of the large numbers of opportunistic 
domain name registrations . . . .”); INTA INTERNET COMM., INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, 
THE UDRP BY ALL ACCOUNTS WORKS EFFECTIVELY—REBUTTAL TO ANALYSIS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF PROFESSOR MICHAEL GEIST IN “FAIR.COM?” AND “FUNDAMENTALLY 
FAIR.COM?” 2, 4–5 (May 6, 2002), available at http://www.inta.org/downloads/ 
tap_udrp_2paper2002.pdf. 
 129 MUELLER, SUCCESS BY DEFAULT, supra note 26, at 15. 
 130 Id. at 16–17 (discussing “defaulting innocents”). 
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confusingly similar manner, but nevertheless fail to respond to the 
complaint.131  If they had responded, innocent defaulters would 
likely prevail in the UDRP proceeding and keep their domain 
name, which is why they are sometimes described as the party that 
“should” win a UDRP case.  Some commentators assume that a 
system in which the party that “should” win fails to respond (and 
therefore nearly always loses) must be inherently unfair or biased, 
or at best in need of fixing.132  Yet, it is also possible that 
defaulting innocents are a necessary (albeit unfortunate) byproduct 
of a system designed to address cybersquatting.  Moreover, the 
characterization of a domain name owner as “innocent” is 
necessarily subjective, since the reasons these “legitimate” domain 
name owners purchased the domain name or defaulted cannot be 
known.133  It is therefore difficult to be certain that these 
respondents were as innocent as some commentators claim—it is 
entirely possible (albeit unlikely) that many of those considered 
“innocents” were actually cybersquatters.  Even assuming 
defaulting innocents are a problem, it would be almost impossible 
to “correct” such a problem, since the reasons for any given default 
cannot be known in advance. 
Commentators have suggested that the high number of defaults 
may be due to insufficient notice procedures134 or inadequate time 
periods in which to respond,135 but it is also possible that even 
innocent respondents do not care enough about a domain name to 
expend the time, cost, and effort necessary to defend it.  Keeping 
the domain name may be worth less to these respondents than the 
cost of paying a lawyer or learning enough about the UDRP to 
respond themselves. 
While situations concerning “innocents” were never meant to 
be decided under the UDRP,136 panels’ decisions in favor of 
 131 Id. 
 132 See id. 
 133 Id. at 17. 
 134 See Froomkin, ICANN’s UDRP, supra note 96, at 674–78. 
 135 See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
 136 Situations concerning innocent respondents are not true cases of cybersquatting and 
were therefore never meant to fall within the sphere of the UDRP. ICANN, Second Staff 
Report, supra note 54, §§ 4.2–4.3 (describing the types of disputes covered by the UDRP 
as cases of cybersquatting or cyberpiracy). 
VOL19_BOOK4_WOODARD 11/16/2009  5:53:20 AM 
1194 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 19:1169 
 
complainants in default cases are not necessarily inaccurate or 
cause for concern that the UDRP is being improperly applied.  Due 
to the narrow “jurisdiction” of the UDRP, complainants are likely 
to frame their complaints in such a way that the situation resembles 
cybersquatting and is therefore easy for panels to decide.  Given 
that cybersquatters account for a large majority of all respondent 
defaults (by one estimate, 87%),137 it is also possible (even likely) 
that the default rate shows the system is functioning as it was 
intended—returning domain names to trademark owners.138  
Although innocent defaulters’ loss of their domain names is 
regrettable, a generally high rate of default decisions does not 
indicate that the UDRP is an unfair or biased process. 
3. Existing System of Provider Choice Encourages Bias 
Another aspect of the UDRP that many commentators have 
claimed shows that it is biased is the rules for choosing providers.  
Under the UDRP, complainants submit a complaint directly to the 
provider of their choice, and respondents are bound to follow this 
choice.139  In addition, complainants generally pay all fees in a 
UDRP proceeding.140  This paradigm makes it appear as if the 
provider is working for the complainant and not impartial, which 
could suggest that the UDRP is unfair.141  Many commentators 
have argued that this structure gives providers an incentive to find 
in favor of trademark owners in order to ensure that future 
 137 MUELLER, SUCCESS BY DEFAULT, supra note 26, at 15, 17. Mueller states that 52% 
of claims result in default judgments and that approximately 25% of defaulters are 
innocent domain name owners. Id. at 17.  This means that 13% of defaulting respondents 
are innocent, and 87% are cybersquatters. 
 138 See id. at 15–17 (suggesting that innocent defaulters represent a problem, but that 
the high number of defaulting cybersquatters indicates that the UDRP functions 
successfully). 
 139 UDRP Policy, supra note 52, § 4(d) (“The complainant shall select the Provider 
from among those approved by ICANN by submitting the complaint to that Provider.  
The selected Provider will administer the proceeding . . . .”). 
 140 Id. § 4(g) (“All fees charged by a Provider in connection with any dispute before an 
Administrative Panel pursuant to this Policy shall be paid by the complainant, except in 
cases where [the respondent] elect[s] to expand the Administrative Panel from one to 
three panelists. . . .”). 
 141 See Thornburg, supra note 8, at 220 (“A system in which one of the parties chooses 
the arbitration provider may involve a subtle kind of direct bias.”). 
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trademark owners select them as the provider for their UDRP 
actions.142  If complainants did not choose providers, the providers 
would have less incentive to rule for them.143 
Arbitration, however, generally requires the provider be chosen 
by agreement of both parties prior to any dispute and included in 
the arbitration clause.144  Since the UDRP has no mechanism for 
pre-dispute negotiations, this solution is clearly not feasible, but 
that does not mean the issue should be ignored.  ICANN struggled 
with this issue in drafting the UDRP,145 which also indicates that 
perhaps the solution chosen may not be ideal.  The possibility that 
the UDRP’s system for choosing providers is flawed suggests the 
need for a better solution. 
B. Panelists Are Given Too Much Freedom 
Another aspect of the UDRP that is frequently criticized is the 
amount of flexibility afforded to panelists.146  Panelists in a UDRP 
proceeding are given significantly more freedom to select 
important aspects of the decision-making process than panelists in 
other types of ADR, most of which require the governing law of 
 142 GEIST, FAIR.COM, supra note 40, at 3 (“[T]here is clearly an incentive for [UDRP] 
providers to curry favor with potential claimants in order to attract future cases . . . .”). 
 143 All potential bias would not be eliminated, however, because providers will always 
have an incentive to rule for trademark owners to encourage them to bring claims under 
the UDRP.  This problem, however, is arguably present to some degree in all ADR 
systems and is less important than the problem created by the current method. 
 144 GOLDBERG, supra note 76, at 214–15. 
 145 See ICANN, First Staff Report, supra note 49 (listing a remaining open 
implementation issue to which comment is sought, “What procedures should be used for 
selection of Providers and Panelists?”); ICANN, Second Staff Report, supra note 54, § 
4.15. 
 146 See Sharrock, supra note 35, at 831 (“Arbitrators’ ability to exercise virtually 
unchecked decisionmaking power has led to a lack of consistency on several key issues 
of domain name use.”); David Wotherspoon & Alex Cameron, Reducing Inconsistency in 
UDRP Cases, 2 CANADIAN J.L. & TECH. 71, 72 (2003), available at http://cjlt.dal.ca/ 
vol2_no1/pdfarticles/wotherspoon.pdf (“It is not surprising that, in the absence of clear 
definitions in the operative section, inconsistent legal frameworks have been applied in 
disputes under the UDRP.”).  See generally M. Scott Donahey, Divergence in the UDRP 
and the Need for Appellate Review, 5 J. INTERNET L. 1 (2002), available at 
http://www.scottdonahey.com/Publications/divergence_in_UDRP.pdf [hereinafter 
Donahey, Divergence in the UDRP] (arguing that disagreements among panelists 
suggests an appellate review is necessary). 
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the proceeding to be mutually agreed upon by the parties in 
advance.147  Freedom of this type can be a good thing, as it was 
intended to—and often does—allow panelists to use their judgment 
to help ensure that each case is handled and decided 
appropriately.148  The issue is that such a broad degree of freedom 
also comes with drawbacks.  Commentators have argued that this 
freedom has led to inconsistent decisions across UDRP panels,149 
reliance on different legal standards in similar cases,150 and an 
expansion of the scope of the UDRP’s “jurisdiction.”151  If these 
criticisms are accurate, it would seem that the flexibility afforded 
by the UDRP may be a liability.  As with the perception of bias 
discussed supra Part II.A, a perception of inconsistent decisions 
could undermine the practical effectiveness of the UDRP and 
should be corrected. 
Much of the freedom in the UDRP is a direct result of its 
design.  The UDRP primarily sets forth procedural rules and 
 147 See, e.g., ICC RULES, supra note 113; Hestermeyer, supra note 13, at 2 (“The legal 
foundation, on which the UDRP rests, however, poses a problem that deserves closer 
examination.”). 
 148 The UDRP would not be considered a success by anyone if the panelists routinely 
decided cases incorrectly. See, e.g., Sharrock, supra note 35, at 831 (“Although the 
UDRP has been largely successful, it is not without its flaws.”). 
 149 Wotherspoon & Cameron, supra note 146, at 71 (“These shortcomings [in the 
UDRP rules] have resulted in inconsistency in the decisions of [UDRP] panels.”).  
Allowing panels to use their own reasoning “is inconsistent with the [UDRP’s] goal of 
global uniformity and has bred inconsistency and unpredictability in the adjudication of 
UDRP disputes.” Id. at 74; see also Sharrock, supra note 35, at 832–39 (discussing 
inconsistency and the UDRP). 
 150 See, e.g., Wotherspoon & Cameron, supra note 146, at 72 (“Rule 15(a) is silent on if 
or how legal principles are to be selected or applied, and Panels have taken a number of 
vastly different approaches.”); Donahey, Divergence in the UDRP, supra note 146.  
Donahey analyzed specific areas in which panelists disagreed on legal theories and 
related those disagreements back to the laws of their home countries. Id. at 4–26.  He 
concluded that, while there have not been an extremely large number of disagreements, 
any “divergence of views, without a meaningful opportunity to harmonize such views, 
leaves the user in a quandary.” Id. at 26. 
 151 See MUELLER, ROUGH JUSTICE, supra note 106, at 4–5; Thornburg, supra note 8, at 
212–13; Wotherspoon & Cameron, supra note 146, at 71–75 (discussing how different 
panels interpret both the law and the UDRP differently and use different mechanisms to 
make their decisions). 
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includes very few substantive rules.152  Since the UDRP was 
intended to be used by people throughout the world (including 
non-lawyers), it is easy to see why ICANN did not include 
substantive law or a specific legal standard, but relied on panelists 
(most of whom are experts) to use their discretion and select the 
appropriate substantive rules for each case.153  Still, ICANN may 
have gone too far in this regard: the only substantive guidance the 
UDRP provides is Rule 15(a), which states that panelists should 
“decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents 
submitted [by the parties] and in accordance with the Policy, th[e] 
Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems 
applicable.”154  This guidance is so vague that two different panels 
hearing identical disputes could quite easily apply different 
substantive rules and reach different results.155 
There is evidence that this concern is more than theoretical: 
studies of past UDRP decisions support the conclusion that 
different panels use different methods to reach their decisions.156  
Indeed, some decisions include detailed explanations of the 
substantive rules that the panel applied and why the panel applied 
those rules, which suggests that the panels themselves may 
struggle with the implementation of the vague guidance provided 
by the UDRP.  For example, some decisions clearly state that the 
panel has only applied the UDRP and not any substantive law.157  
Other decisions “rel[y] on prior UDRP decisions as . . . 
precedent,”158 a practice that is neither expressly prohibited nor 
 152 See UDRP Policy, supra note 52; UDRP Rules, supra note 55.  This aspect of the 
UDRP resembles the rules for mediation. See, e.g., JAMS—International Mediation 
Rules, http://www.jamsadr.com/international-mediation-rules (last visited Nov. 3, 2009). 
 153 See MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 24, at 753. 
 154 UDRP Rules, supra note 55, at 15(a). 
 155 Donahey, Divergence in the UDRP, supra note 146, at 3 (“With such broad 
standards and the great discretion given to the panels, it is no wonder that panels have 
expressed divergent views as to what is required to establish these requirements.”); 
MUELLER, ROUGH JUSTICE, supra note 106, at 21 (“In some cases, differences in outcome 
are created when panelists ignore critical aspects of the policy, or stretch the defined 
criteria so broadly that they become almost meaningless.”). 
 156 Wotherspoon & Cameron, supra note 146, at 72. 
 157 Id. at 72–73. 
 158 Id. at 73. 
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condoned by the UDRP rules.  Still other decisions “have 
expressly drawn on national laws in deciding disputes.”159 
Rule 15(a) is not the only aspect of the UDRP that grants 
panelists a level of freedom that could be having negative 
consequences.  For example, the UDRP uses many terms that have 
specific meanings in most legal systems (e.g., “bad faith” and 
“confusingly similar”).160  Although the UDRP defines some of 
these terms, it does so through non-exclusive lists of examples 
without any other guidance.161  Given this lack of direction, it 
seems almost inevitable that panelists will, consciously or 
unconsciously, apply the meanings that these terms are given under 
their national laws rather than the meanings intended to be given 
these terms under the UDRP.162  More importantly, the rules do 
not even specifically preclude such an association, even though it 
could affect the outcome of a case and create inconsistencies.163 
A potentially more serious consequence of the discretion given 
to UDRP panels is that many panels have used that discretion to 
expand the scope of their own jurisdiction and decide claims that 
are outside the scope of the UDRP’s intended purpose.164  
Commentators often point to a type of claim known as a “sucks 
case” as strong evidence of this practice.165  Sucks cases generally 
involve a complaint by a trademark owner to recover a domain 
name that consists of its trademark with the word “sucks” 
appended to it (e.g., www.[trademark]sucks.com).166  The 
complainant’s theory is that the use of the trademarked name with 
“sucks” (or another negative term) appended is confusingly similar 
 159 Id.  The laws used vary among panels; some use one or both party’s laws, while 
others use a completely unrelated law. Id. at 73–75. 
 160 UDRP Policy, supra note 52, §§ 4(a)(i), 4(b). 
 161 See, e.g., id. § 4(b) (defining bad faith). 
 162 Since many panelists are lawyers in the field, it is very likely they would know 
either the U.S. law’s definition for these terms or their own country’s definition so well 
that it would be extremely difficult not to at least unconsciously think of it when reading 
the UDRP rules or the parties’ documents. See Donahey, Divergence in the UDRP, supra 
note 146, at 4–11 (discussing the different ways panels analyze the term “confusing 
similarity”). 
 163 See UDRP Rules, supra note 55, at 15(a). 
 164 Thornburg, supra note 8, at 212–13. 
 165 See Donahey, Divergence in the UDRP, supra note 146, at 6–10. 
 166 See MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 24, at 755. 
VOL19_BOOK4_WOODARD 11/16/2009  5:53:20 AM 
2009] ADR, ARBITRATION & THE UDRP 1199 
 
and itself prima facie evidence that the domain name was 
registered in bad faith.167  In the trademark owner’s view, the only 
possible reason to use such a name is to damage or embarrass the 
mark or the owner, which means the respondent is acting in bad 
faith.168  These cases involve complex issues such as the interplay 
of freedom of speech and a trademark owner’s right to protect its 
mark,169 and are therefore not included among the types of claims 
that can be brought under the UDRP.170  This has not stopped 
trademark owners from bringing these types of claims under the 
UDRP, and those that do so receive very different treatment from 
different panels.171  Although some panels correctly dismiss these 
claims outright,172 many panels consider such cases examples of 
abusive bad faith registrations that can be decided under the 
UDRP.173 
 167 See Sharrock, supra note 35 at 834–36; Froomkin, ICANN’s UDRP, supra note 96, 
at 664–65. 
 168 See UDRP Policy, supra note 52, § 4(b) (defining bad faith). 
 169 See generally Donahey, Divergence in the UDRP, supra note 146. 
 170 See ICANN, Second Staff Report, supra note 54, § 4.1(c) (describing the types of 
disputes the UDRP covers). 
 171 See, e.g., R. Scott MacKendrick et al., Do Borders Matter? International 
Implications of Doing Business on the Internet, (ALI-ABA Course of Study, May 10–11, 
2007), SM045 ALI-ABA 101, 130–31.  There are two lines of decisions in “sucks” cases: 
the panels that conclude the domain names should be returned to the trademark holder, 
and the panels that conclude the opposite, usually that there is a free speech issue 
involved. Id. 
 172 See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Dan Parisi, WIPO Case No. D2000-1015 (Jan. 
11, 2001), available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-
1015.html (ruling on lockheedsucks.com and lockheedmartinsucks.com).  In fact, many 
commentators believe the “sucks cases” implicate free speech more than cybersquatting, 
as the websites are often designed to criticize either a brand name or product of the same 
name as the domain name, not to sell anything or otherwise make a profit. See 
MacKendrick, supra note 171, at 130–31.  These critics argue that, by rendering 
decisions concerning these sites, the panels have ignored the spirit of the UDRP and the 
rules, and have thereby misused the discretion afforded to them. See Sharrock, supra note 
35 at 836 (“[I]nconsistent application of the UDRP . . . is a serious problem, as it impedes 
individual decisionmaking and undermines the integrity of both ICANN and the 
UDRP.”). 
 173 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Walsucks, WIPO Case No. D2000-0477, (July 20, 
2000), available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-
0477.html (ruling on wal-martcanadasucks.com); see MacKendrick, supra note 171, at 
130; see also Donahey, Divergence in the UDRP, supra note 146, at 7–11. 
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Although none of these issues are significant in and of 
themselves, taken together it is clear that the flexibility in the 
UDRP has created problems, including inconsistent decisions.174  
Flexibility may have seemed like a laudable goal—and one in 
keeping with the spirit of ADR175—yet it is unclear whether the 
benefits outweigh the costs of the inconsistent results and other 
inadvertent side effects that accompany them.  It seems likely that 
the best course for the UDRP now would be to provide less 
freedom to panelists and more structure, which is in keeping with 
the arbitration systems on which it was modeled.176 
C. Lack of an Internal Appellate Body 
Under the UDRP, the only way complainants and respondents 
can challenge a panel decision is to proceed to court.177  Critics 
have argued that the UDRP would operate more effectively and 
fairly if it included an internal review board—essentially an 
appellate body—that could hear appeals.178  These critics claim 
that such a board is necessary to “provide uniformity to the 
process,”179 reduce inconsistencies among UDRP decisions,180 and 
“establish principles and precedent under the UDRP, which other 
 174 Wotherspoon & Cameron, supra note 146, at 71–75 (“These shortcomings [in the 
UDRP] have resulted in inconsistency in the decisions of arbitral panels.”). 
 175 ADR is known and prized for its flexibility and ability to adapt to different situations 
and types of disputes. N.Y. State Dep’t of Civil Serv., Hearing Officer’s Manual, ch. 7: 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, http://www.cs.state.ny.us/pio/hearingofficermanual/ 
chapter07-adr.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). 
 176 Arbitration’s use of a governing law necessarily constrains arbitrators’ decisions. 
See id. 
 177 UDRP Policy, supra note 55, § 3(b)(xiii); see Wotherspoon & Cameron, supra note 
146, at 78. 
 178 E.g., Donahey, The UDRP—Fundamentally Fair, supra note 100, at 5 (“I have 
advocated, and continue to advocate, an appellate panel to which . . . cases can be 
referred.”). 
 179 Kelley, supra note 33, at 194–203 (arguing that the UDRP needs an appeals board 
and suggesting the form the board should take); Wotherspoon & Cameron, supra note 
146, at 71 (“[A]n [internal] appeal tribunal should be constituted so that panels and 
parties could have recourse to a body of well-established UDRP precedent.”). 
 180 See, e.g., Donahey, Divergence in the UDRP, supra note 146, at 26 (arguing that 
disagreements among the panelists suggest an appellate review is necessary); see also 
Kelley, supra note 33, at 195 (“[A] UDRP appellate process would present a more 
accessible forum for parties who feel their cases were decided incorrectly.”). 
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lower level Panels would be required to follow.”181  The concept 
of binding precedent sounds compelling,182 but in practice it would 
be likely to add another complication for innocent respondents 
who would have little time to study existing precedent.  Moreover, 
it seems unavoidable that complainants (and some savvy 
respondents) would tailor their arguments to fit within any such 
precedent, providing them an advantage over innocent respondents 
without the time or knowledge to do the same.  Thus, it is at least 
arguable that any potential benefits of uniformity are outweighed 
by the potential disadvantages to innocent respondents. 
It is not as if other ADR systems provide for internal reviews 
of decisions.  In fact, the concept of appellate review (internal or 
external) is foreign to most—if not all—ADR systems.183  Most 
ADR systems do not provide for any review of decisions, and 
those that do allow review usually severely limit it.184  For 
example, most arbitration providers include a clause in their rules 
similar to the following: “[e]very Award shall be binding on the 
parties . . . [who] undertake to carry out any Award without delay 
and shall be deemed to have waived their right to any form of 
recourse insofar as such waiver can validly be made.”185  
Arbitration thus typically prizes finality above any increase in 
fairness that could be achieved through appellate review.186 
In fact, the UDRP went further than most systems of ADR by 
providing either party with the right to proceed to court at any 
point during a dispute and to appeal an adverse decision.187  Some 
commentators have nevertheless maintained that judicial review is 
 181 Wotherspoon & Cameron, supra note 146, at 78. 
 182 See, e.g., Donahey, Divergence in the UDRP, supra note 146, at 26 (discussing the 
need for something similar to precedent to harmonize panels’ different interpretations of 
the UDRP). 
 183 See, e.g., MUELLER, ROUGH JUSTICE, supra note 106, at 19.  Some forms of 
arbitration require decisions to be binding. GOLDBERG, supra note 76, at 213–14.  
Arbitration providers such as the ICC or AAA do not have an independent review board 
like the one advocated for the UDRP. See id. at 4. 
 184 See GOLDBERG, supra note 76, at 213–15.  In America, arbitration awards may be 
challenged in court using the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which allows awards to 
be challenged in only four situations. See Sorkin, supra note 89, at 36–37. 
 185 ICC RULES, supra note 113, art. 28, § 6. 
 186 See Sorkin, supra note 89, at 37. 
 187 UDRP Policy, supra note 52, § 4(k). 
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not sufficient,188 as it does not provide the same interpretive 
function as would a review panel.189  The availability of judicial 
review was important to ICANN,190 as it was seen as blunting any 
claim that the UDRP was a form of private lawmaking that 
usurped the authority of national courts.191  In view of this, it 
seems unlikely that ICANN would replace judicial review with a 
UDRP-specific review procedure.  This suggests that the only 
feasible option would be to give the loser in a UDRP preceding the 
right to appeal either internally to a UDRP-specific appellate body 
or externally to a court. 
Adding an additional layer (even an optional one) to the UDRP 
would increase the complexity and decrease the speed of 
proceedings, crucial objectives for UDRP participants (particularly 
complainants).192  In addition, to ensure consistency of decisions, 
any internal UDRP-specific review board would need to have 
either permanent panelists and/or extremely detailed rules 
(possibly even a governing law).  More, if the internal appeals 
process were made inexpensive and simple (as most commentators 
suggest),193 it would encourage losing cybersquatters to file an 
appeal, since the additional delay would allow them to continue to 
 188 See Baratta & Hanaman, supra note 29, at 377 (“[There is] a tension between the 
wholly binding nature of the UDRP on a respondent, and the second-chance for a 
complainant to have a lost arbitration redecided in court.”); see also Froomkin, ICANN’s 
UDRP, supra note 96, at 705–06. 
 189 Court cases cannot interpret the rules of the UDRP, because they generally do not 
defer to a UDRP decision in a case, preferring instead to treat each case separately and 
subject to de novo review. Speidel, supra note 80, at 175. 
 190 Froomkin, ICANN’s UDRP, supra note 96, at 705 (“Ensuring that registrants would 
have some sort of access to a judge after losing an arbitration was a critical element of the 
original compromise that produced the UDRP.”).  ICANN was especially concerned 
about providing access to courts, because the UDRP is mandatory for respondents and 
they did not want it to seem unfair. See WIPO Paper, supra note 40, ¶ 140. 
 191 The WIPO Paper emphasizes the importance placed on allowing judicial review, 
stating that: “[i]t is recommended that any dispute-resolution system, which is alternative 
to litigation and to which domain name applicants are required to submit, should not deny 
the parties to the dispute access to court litigation.” See WIPO Paper, supra note 40, ¶ 
140. 
 192 See ICANN—General Information, supra note 20 (“The UDRP is designed to be 
efficient and cost effective.”). 
 193 See, e.g., Donahey, Adding Appeals Procedure, supra note 9, at 6 (“An appellate 
process that is limited in scope, fast in result, and relatively inexpensive can provide 
needed predictability and added credibility to the UDRP Process.”). 
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profit from the domain name.  The situation would be even worse 
for trademark owners if the respondents were still entitled to 
proceed to court after an adverse internal appeal.194  Thus, the 
addition of an internal UDRP-only appeals board could harm both 
innocent respondents and complaining trademark owners.  It would 
seem that the addition of the appeals board would only benefit two 
groups—cybersquatters and some critics of the UDRP—suggesting 
that not including any appellate process was the correct decision. 
III. FIXING THE UDRP 
Although most would agree that the UDRP is not perfect, that 
does not mean it should be abolished or substantially rewritten.  
Even though some scholars may advocate for a different method of 
managing the problem of cybersquatting,195 the UDRP is not 
fundamentally unfair or invalid.  With a few modifications 
suggested by ADR principles, the main issues plaguing the 
UDRP—(1) provider/panelist bias in favor of trademark owners 
and (2) inconsistent decisions—can be corrected or at least 
significantly lessened.   
A. UDRP Decisions Should Not Be Fully Public 
The issue of provider bias (actual or perceived) is perhaps the 
most fundamental issue confronting the UDRP.  Any system of 
dispute resolution loses its effectiveness if people do not believe 
that they will receive a fair hearing.  As discussed above, this 
perception of the UDRP exists even if it is not valid.196  However, 
this is an issue that would be easy to address, as it has already been 
confronted and effectively addressed in the context of 
 194 Most cybersquatters, even the ones who responded and appealed, however, would be 
unlikely to exercise the option to proceed to court due to the large expense generally 
associated with litigation. 
 195 See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Privatizing Commercial Law: Lessons from ICANN, 6 
J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 257, 276 (2002) (“ICANN’s choice[] . . . to continue using 
a first-come-first-serve rule and an ex post dispute resolution system to allocate domain 
names, and not to use technological means to resolve disputes or manage the conflicting 
claims of multiple potential users, [may not be] optimal . . . .”). 
 196 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
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arbitration.197  The method that most systems of arbitration use to 
prevent perceived or actual bias of decision makers is to generally 
prohibit the publication of decisions.198 
ICANN could easily halt or limit the publication of UDRP 
decisions.  This change would address the problem created by the 
UDRP rule that allows complainants to choose the provider that 
will decide their case.199  Since UDRP decisions are public, before 
choosing a provider complainants can search past decisions to find 
the provider that seems most likely to be receptive to their 
argument/claim.200  Since providers and panelists know such a 
search is possible (even likely), they might (consciously or 
unconsciously) favor trademark owners (who bring the majority of 
complaints) to ensure they receive more business from future 
trademark owners.  Any natural tendencies for providers to favor 
complainants would likely have been amplified when 
eResolution.com, the provider considered the most respondent 
friendly,201 shut down due to a lack of funds.202  While there could 
have been many reasons for eResolution’s failure,203 other 
providers could easily interpret it as proof that keeping trademark 
owners happy is vital to their financial success.204  Making all 
future UDRP decisions confidential would greatly lessen or 
eliminate this potential reason for bias, as future complainants 
would not be able to seek out receptive providers. 
 197 Indeed, it may have been addressed too well; despite evidence to the contrary, many 
people believe that arbitrators are more likely to arrive at a compromise decision (to 
“split the baby”) than to decide in favor of one of the parties to a claim. See GOLDBERG, 
supra note 76, at 214. 
 198 See id. (listing the objective standards on which the arbitrator’s decision is to be 
based and the advantage of maintaining the confidentiality of arbitration proceedings). 
 199 Trademark owners choose providers by submitting their claims to one of the ICANN 
approved providers. UDRP Policy, supra note 52, § 4(d). 
 200 See generally GEIST, FAIR.COM, supra note 40. 
 201 See id. at 3. 
 202 UDRPinfo.com, supra note 95. 
 203 See, e.g., BRANTHOVER, supra note 7, at 4–5 (arguing that reputation is the primary 
motivation for choice of provider, and eResolution’s less prominent reputation caused its 
failure). 
 204 See GEIST, FAIR.COM, supra note 40, at 4–6; see also GEIST, FUNDAMENTALLY 
FAIR.COM, supra note 121, at 4–6. 
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If ICANN decided to make new decisions confidential, 
however, it would still face a problem with the large number of 
decisions currently available.205  More, privatization would almost 
certainly generate criticism, specifically that: (1) privatization 
decreases transparency and therefore fairness,206 and (2) 
privatization removes panels’ ability to use earlier decisions as 
precedent.207 
Although ADR systems such as arbitration do not use past 
decisions as precedent,208 UDRP panels often use precedent to 
decide cases, and it could be difficult to change that now.209  The 
best solution is likely a compromise between the two extremes: 
UDRP decisions should be redacted to eliminate provider, panelist, 
and perhaps even party names and published only on websites 
unaffiliated with a provider.210  Redacting this information would 
ensure that trademark owners cannot perform the type of search 
discussed above, while still allowing precedent to be used in future 
UDRP proceedings.  Although redacting decisions prior to 
publication may not be the only method of solving the problem of 
providers favoring trademark owners, it is a way to lessen 
providers’ incentive relatively simply and inexpensively. 
B. ICANN Should Choose the Provider 
Although the redaction solution discussed supra Part III.A  is 
likely the best and easiest way to address concerns about provider 
 205 ICANN, the WIPO, and several other websites collect UDRP decisions, results, or 
statistics. World Intellectual Property Organization—Case Outcome by Year(s) 
(Breakdown), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/statistics/outcome.jsp (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2009). 
 206 See GEIST, FAIR.COM, supra note 40, at 31 (arguing that ICANN needs greater 
transparency to be fair). 
 207 MUELLER, SUCCESS BY DEFAULT, supra note 26, at 19 (“Our data show that UDRP 
decisions cite other UDRP decisions more than half the time.”). 
 208 Id. (“Most systems of arbitration are not considered to be precedent-based . . . .”).  
Since decisions are private or on a case-by-case basis, most ADR systems are incapable 
of using precedent. 
 209 Sorkin, supra note 89, at 43 (“[T]he UDRP has in effect given rise to a new system 
of international common law, with panelists increasingly citing to, and relying upon, 
previous UDRP decisions.” (citations omitted)). 
 210 Panels are currently allowed to redact decisions in “exceptional” circumstances 
only. UDRP Policy, supra note 52, § 4(j). 
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bias, there is a very real chance that it will be deemed too radical 
or controversial to implement.  However, even if this were the 
case, provider bias is too important and potentially damaging to 
ignore.  An alternative, less radical solution would be to modify 
the UDRP so that trademark owners no longer select the 
provider.211  Although the method of selection used by arbitration, 
where the parties agree in advance on a provider, is unlikely to be 
practicable in the context of the UDRP, the idea behind it (that the 
provider is not chosen by a single party) is an important one.212  
The current method of complainants selecting and paying for 
providers makes it appear as if the provider is the complainant’s 
employee, which raises doubts about the UDRP’s fairness.213  
Therefore, the UDRP should be modified so that complainants do 
not choose the provider.  Instead, complaints should be submitted 
to ICANN for distribution to approved providers using one of the 
several methods discussed below.214 
The first and perhaps most obvious way to distribute claims 
would be for ICANN to randomly select a provider for each 
proceeding.  For example, a computer program could be run when 
a complaint is submitted to randomly select an approved provider.  
This would ensure fairness but could result in a perception that 
some providers are being used more often than others.  An 
arguably fairer solution would be for ICANN to assign claims to 
providers in the order they appear on a secret list that is scrambled 
each time through.215  This option is similar to the way the New 
York Eastern District Court chooses mediators216 and has the 
 211 See Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Market for Private Dispute Resolution 
Services—An Empirical Re-Assessment of ICANN-UDRP Performance, 11 MICH. 
TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV 285, 326 (2005) (“[C]omplainants can choose a provider based 
on the bias favoring the complainants.”). 
 212 Ware, supra note 80, at 161. 
 213 See Thornburg, supra note 8, at 220. 
 214 Although this argument may seem similar to the review board described infra Part 
III.C, it requires less resources and oversight by ICANN and can essentially be 
automated. 
 215 An example of the way this list would work is: claim 1 goes to NAF, claim 2 to 
WIPO, claim 3 to ADNDRC, claim 4 to CAC, claim 5 to ADNDRC, claim 6 to NAF, 
claim 7 to CAC, etc. 
 216 FED. COURTS COMM., N.Y. CITY BAR ASS’N, GUIDE TO MEDIATION IN THE SOUTHERN 
& EASTERN DISTRICT OF N.Y. (July 2006), available at 
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benefit of simplicity and fairness.  In addition, providers should 
assign panelists in the same way, thereby removing any hint of bias 
created by the overuse of certain panelists at certain providers.217  
Both options, of course, would be subject to provider and panel 
availability, but even if a choice were not available, the system 
itself would not be compromised or biased—the parties would 
simply move on to the next choice in the rotation. 
C. The UDRP Should Provide Clearer Legal Guidelines 
Another easy way to improve the fairness of UDRP 
proceedings would be to provide clearer legal guidelines to 
panelists with the goal of reducing the number of inconsistent 
decisions.218  As discussed supra Part II.B, UDRP panelists are 
given substantial discretion over many substantive aspects of 
cases, which has led to inconsistent decisions.  The reason for 
many of these inconsistencies can arguably be traced back to an 
area in which the UDRP differs substantially from other methods 
of ADR: the governing law (or lack thereof).  As mentioned supra 
Part I.C, the parties to an arbitration usually agree that a particular 
country’s law will apply to any proceedings (the “governing law”), 
and arbitrators are bound to apply the selected law.219  Further, the 
major arbitration providers have standard practices that are 
followed to select a governing law if an arbitration clause does not 
explicitly state one, as an arbitration cannot proceed without a 
governing law.220  Conversely, the UDRP has no provision through 
which parties can pre-select a governing law. 
http://www.nyed.uscourts.gov/adr/Mediation/Mediation__Documents/10494-Guide%20 
to%20ADR-br-v14.pdf. 
 217 See generally GEIST, FAIR.COM, supra note 40 (presenting and discussing data 
concerning panelist bias).  Regardless of whether it is ultimately used to choose 
providers, one of these two options should be used by providers to select panelists, as 
either would have low administrative costs and would increase fairness. 
 218 For another perspective on how to add definitions to the UDRP, see Wotherspoon & 
Cameron, supra note 146, at 75–77. 
 219 See, e.g., ICC RULES, supra note 113, art. 15 § 1.  The Rules actually state that 
parties may find it desirable to stipulate in the arbitration clause itself the law governing 
the contract to decrease the potential for argument once the proceedings begin. Id. at 3. 
 220 If the arbitration clause does not explicitly specify a governing law, it will most 
likely be selected by the arbitrator(s), because parties often find it extremely difficult to 
agree on a law once the dispute has begun. 
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Although there are a number of legitimate reasons why the 
UDRP cannot follow the example of arbitration and add an explicit 
governing law provision, the rules should be amended to more 
clearly define the legal standards that should be applied.221  As the 
example of arbitration demonstrates, adding a governing law 
should solve the issues of vague rules and inconsistent application 
of rules.  However, the lack of a pre-existing contractual 
relationship between the parties to a UDRP action renders it all but 
impossible for the parties to mutually agree on a single governing 
law.  Further, although there are many possible ways in which a 
single governing law could be selected for UDRP proceedings, a 
closer examination of these possibilities reveals that none of them 
are good candidates for implementation. 
The first possibility would be for ICANN to select a single 
country’s law to govern all UDRP proceedings.  This solution 
would be easy to implement but would likely create as many issues 
as it solved.  Every country whose law was not selected by ICANN 
would criticize ICANN’s choice as indicative of a bias in favor of 
the selected country, and raise concerns that the UDRP was not 
representing the interests of all countries.  In addition, if 
complainants felt the chosen governing law was unfavorable to 
their interests, they could abandon the UDRP entirely in favor of 
litigation in local courts, which would render the UDRP 
ineffective. 
Another possibility would be to require that the law of the 
respondent’s country govern a UDRP proceeding.  This choice 
would have the benefit of avoiding the criticism discussed above, 
but it might also lead to fewer claims being brought by 
complainants who are skeptical of such a change.  Even if 
complainants did not protest, however, such a change would be 
unlikely to correct all issues of uniformity and predictability of 
decisions.  Since respondents can be located anywhere in the 
world, each UDRP proceeding could theoretically be decided 
 221 ICANN’s decision to diverge from traditional ADR principles by imposing only 
vague legal standards on panelists has led to inconsistent decisions by panels, as well as 
panels adjudicating disputes that arguably are outside the intended scope of their 
authority. See MUELLER, ROUGH JUSTICE, supra note 106, at 21–23; Wotherspoon & 
Cameron, supra note 146, at 72–75. 
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under a different country’s law.  This would almost certainly lead 
to inconsistent decisions, even between identically composed 
panels deciding cases with similar facts.222  Inconsistency such as 
this is unacceptable for a “uniform” system and would likely lead 
to its disuse. 
The final possibility for a single governing law is for ICANN 
to require the governing law of a UDRP proceeding be that of the 
registrar’s home country.223  This solution would have the same 
principal drawback as the use of the respondent’s country, as it 
would lead to decisions that vary depending on the home country 
of each registrar.  The more significant problem with this 
suggestion, however, is that it would favor domain name owners 
(or, in many cases, cybersquatters) by effectively allowing them to 
dictate the law governing any challenge to their ownership by 
registering domain names with a registrar in a country with 
favorable laws.224 
Given the problems with selecting a single governing law, the 
best solution is to clarify, narrow, and supplement the existing 
UDRP rules.225  First, all terms defined through non-exhaustive 
lists should be given actual definitions, because the use of an open-
ended list of examples creates opportunities for panels to reach 
incorrect outcomes and inconsistent decisions.226  Next, terms that 
carry specific meanings in existing legal systems (e.g., 
“confusingly similar”) should either be replaced with different 
terms that do not have the same associations, or should be clearly 
defined for purposes of the UDRP.  Any other ambiguous or 
undefined terms should also be defined.  Any such changes to the 
 222 Panelists are not necessarily experts in all legal systems, which means that this 
method could lead to a reduced number of possible panelists and/or panelists interpreting 
laws incorrectly and thereby deciding proceedings incorrectly. 
 223 See MUELLER, ROUGH JUSTICE, supra note 106, at 2. 
 224 Arguably, when choosing where to register a name, most people would never 
consider the impact of the choice on a possible challenge to their ownership.  This is not 
true of a cybersquatter, however, who may be expected to consider the choice of law 
when deciding where to register.  A cynical person could theorize that this would, in turn, 
lead registrars to enact more domain name holder-friendly rules to encourage 
cybersquatters to use their registry. 
 225 For another perspective on modifying the UDRP and adding an appellate panel, see 
generally Wotherspoon & Cameron, supra note 146. 
 226 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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UDRP would have to be carefully drafted and analyzed to ensure 
that they made the process clearer and not more complicated.  
However, these types of modifications to the UDRP would require 
less financial and administrative effort by ICANN, and likely 
garner less controversy, than the other possible solutions. 
D. ICANN Should Create a UDRP Oversight Body 
Although drafting rules that more clearly specify what types of 
disputes can and cannot be decided under the UDRP would be the 
easiest and quickest way to bring more uniformity to the UDRP, 
the evidence shows that even that is unlikely to stop providers 
from deciding cases that are outside the scope of the UDRP.227  If 
further rules are not an effective solution, the only way to address 
this significant issue may be for ICANN to create a neutral, 
internal group to oversee the UDRP and ensure that it is not 
applied too broadly.228 
The best way for such an oversight group to operate would be 
as the single, centralized submission point for new UDRP 
complaints.  Each complaint would be reviewed to determine 
whether it meets the requirements of the UDRP, and the ones that 
meet the requirements would then be passed to a randomly selected 
provider.229  Complaints that do not meet the requirements of the 
UDRP would be returned to the complainant without prejudice.  
Although providers are already supposed to screen UDRP 
complaints for compliance with the rules,230 there is substantial 
evidence that they do not do so effectively, as many non-
cybersquatting cases are decided under the auspices of the UDRP 
each year.231 
While a pre-dispute screening body might be the best practical 
solution, this role would place ICANN squarely at the forefront of 
 227 See supra Part II.B. 
 228 This group would not be similar to the appellate body discussed supra Part II.C, as it 
would not hear appeals concerning decisions. 
 229 This group could also oversee the assignment of providers to new complaints if the 
solution discussed supra Part III.B were also adopted. 
 230 See UDRP Policy, supra note 52, § 4(a) (describing applicable disputes). 
 231 See Case Outcome by Year(s) (Breakdown), supra note 205 (showing the outcomes 
of all UDRP cases by year, including many in which the respondent prevailed). 
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claims, which would invite increased scrutiny and could lead to 
even more intense criticism of the organization.232  If a pre-review 
system were deemed impracticable for this or other reasons, 
another possibility would be to establish a post-facto review board 
of limited scope.  Instead of reviewing new UDRP complaints, this 
board would directly review the providers.  The board would 
examine each provider’s decisions on a recurring basis (e.g., on a 
specified date each year) to ensure that providers do not broaden or 
misapply the UDRP.  If a specified percentage of a provider’s 
decisions exceeded the scope of its authority under the UDRP or 
otherwise were handled inappropriately, the provider could face 
sanctions, including loss of its accreditation.  This would force 
providers to better supervise their panelists or risk completely 
losing UDRP business, while allowing ICANN to play a smaller 
role in case administration. 
If such a provider review did not curtail the bias and criticism, 
the board could extend its inquiries into individual panelists.  The 
board could examine each panelist’s decisions to see if he or she 
followed all of the rules, or if a disproportionate number of the 
panelist’s decisions favored one side.233  If a panelist were found 
to have consistently misapplied the rules or demonstrated bias, the 
panelist would be prohibited from serving on future UDRP panels.  
This alternative would have to be carefully constructed and 
administered to avoid sanctioning a panelist who merely heard a 
disproportionate number of “true” cybersquatting cases.234  Given 
this, the fairest form of this option would be to implement a 
combination of a provider and panelist review board to ensure that 
no one is penalized unjustly.  Any review board, however, should 
have the power to revoke the accreditation of (or otherwise 
 232 For a detailed collection of criticism of ICANN, see ICANNWatch, supra note 19. 
 233 The decisions must be reviewed to ensure the one-sided results were not due to the 
nature of the cases heard by the panelists.  Since a panelist decides fewer cases than a 
provider receives, it is possible that the few cases that a panelist receives could be clear 
cases of cybersquatting that necessitate a complainant victory and therefore are not issues 
of a panelist misapplying the rules. 
 234 There are a number of reasons why decisions could be disproportionately decided in 
favor of one side, including that the UDRP was designed to return cybersquatted domain 
names to trademark owners, so any such review would need to be undertaken carefully 
and not precipitously. BRANTHOVER, supra note 7, at 3–7 (arguing against one study’s 
analysis of data it collected). 
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penalize) providers or panelists who it finds disproportionately 
favor one party or break the rules.235 
The most significant obstacle to instituting any kind of 
gatekeeping body is likely to be the cost.  The most obvious way to 
fund such a body would be to assess monetary penalties on 
trademark holders who bring improper claims, providers who 
accept improper claims, and/or panelists who decide improper 
claims.236  Such penalties, however, could easily lead to a 
perception of a conflict of interest, as ICANN could characterize 
borderline claims as improper in order to increase profits.  
Therefore, the best way to fund any gatekeeping body would be for 
ICANN to add a modest supplementary charge to all UDRP 
proceedings.237  Regardless of the method chosen, screening 
claims to ensure that they meet the criteria of the UDRP is 
important enough that ICANN should ignore any increased 
criticism and logistical difficulties.  In all likelihood, the increased 
fairness in the UDRP would eventually win over
IV. THE UDRP IS SUCCESSFUL, BUT IS IT A COMPLETE SUCCESS? 
It is clear that the UDRP has succeeded in its primary goal of 
providing an easier way for trademark owners to recover domain 
names registered in bad faith.238  This, however, does not mean 
that the UDRP is a complete success.  After ten years and volumes 
of criticism, two distinct issues still persist: (1) some legitimate 
domain name owners lose their trademarks in UDRP actions, and 
(2) there is a widespread perception that the UDRP is unfair or 
 235 In FAIR.COM, Michael Geist described some panelists who nearly always ruled for 
trademark owners and who were also chosen as panelists a disproportionate amount of 
the time. GEIST, FAIR.COM, supra note 40, at 24. 
 236 It is unclear whether ICANN currently has the power to fine improper users of the 
UDRP, but it does not seem outside the scope of their authority and is a possibility at 
least worth mentioning. 
 237 The number of UDRP claims brought annually has exceeded 2000 in recent years, 
so assessing an additional administrative fee of $50 would result in a budget for the 
gatekeeping body of over $100,000. See ICANN—List of Proceedings Under the 
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, supra note 74. 
 238 See, e.g., MUELLER, SUCCESS BY DEFAULT, supra note 26, at 3. 
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biased.239  Although perception might seem unimportant, a system 
cannot be successful if the general consensus is that it is unfair.  
Therefore, for the UDRP to be a true success, both of these issues 
must be addressed. 
This Note has proposed several potential solutions ICANN can 
enact to make the UDRP fairer and to make it appear fairer.  The 
best outcome would be if ICANN redacted decisions, enacted 
clearer rules and legal standards, and created an oversight body, 
but the addition of any of the alternatives discussed supra Part III 
would improve the UDRP.  However, even if none of the solutions 
are enacted, the UDRP should not be withdrawn or replaced, 
because there is a real need for the fast solution to cybersquatting 
claims provided by the UDRP. 
 
 239 This view has become so widespread that it is even being included in textbooks. See, 
e.g., MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 24, at 754–59 (“The fast and cheap nature 
of the UDRP process—and arguably the pro-trademark slant of its decisions—has 
attracted hordes of trademark owners.”). 
